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THE WORK OF THE LOUISIANA APPELLATE
COURTS FOR THE 1977-1978 TERM
A Symposium
[Editor's Note. The articles in this symposium discuss se-
lected decisions of Louisiana appellate courts reported in the
advance sheets dated July 1, 1977, to July 1, 1978.]
PRIVATE LAW
LAW IN GENERAL'
Robert A. Pascal*
LEGISLATION BY SILENCE
The opinion in Phillips v. Nereaux' contains the amazing
proposition that if the legislature has not enacted law contra-
dicting a judicial practice inconsistent with the legislation on
the subject, the practice stands as a "judicially created require-
ment." The writer knows of only two imperative sources of
rules of legal order in Louisiana, legislation as defined in article
1 of the Civil Code and custom in accordance with article 3. A
"judicially created requirement" is not legislation, and it is not
custom. Custom can come into being only by popular acquiesc-
ence. The particular "judicially created requirement" dealt
with in Phillips is the "double declaration" of the purchaser of
an immovable with separate funds if he would avoid a
"judicially created" characterization of the immovable as a
community asset. That the judicial practice and characteriza-
tion have not been accepted popularly is attested to by the
frequent attacks upon its legitimacy in legal writings and re-
peated suits down to Phillips.'
THE RIGHT TO A MEANINGFUL TRIAL AND TO A MEANINGFUL APPEAL
Having pronounced affirmatively on legislation by silence,
the opinion in Phillips v. Nereaux proceeds (1) to find the
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center.
i. 357 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
2. See the list of cases cited in Phillips, 357 So. 2d 813, 818.
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"judicially created requirement" of a "double declaration" in
violation of the equal protection clauses of the Louisiana and
United States Constitutions, but then (2) to refuse to declare
it invalid because the Louisiana Supreme Court had affirmed
its constitutionality implicitly in a previous decision by deny-
ing a writ of review.' The court openly confesses that it refrains
from giving judgment according to its construction of the law
because the Louisiana Supreme Court has "mandated" lower
courts to follow its decisions.' It is submitted that this subservi-
ence renders trials in lower courts and appeals meaningless and
wasteful of the litigants' and the judiciary's time and money
insofar as the issue of law is concerned, for under the practice
the litigant has no hope of success in either court. The writer
is not suggesting that respect should not be paid to decisions
of higher courts, or that judges on lower courts should not be
prudent and avoid useless appeals to higher courts. But if the
trial or appellate judges believe a litigant to be in the right and
that the error in a previous higher court judgment can be dem-
onstrated, then it would seem obligatory on the judge or judges
to render a decision in conformity with the law as they see it.
This is particularly true of dtcisions by the Louisiana courts of
appeal, for in most instances review by the supreme court is not
a matter of right. Human nature being what it is, the appellate
judges (unlike those of the court of appeal in this instance) may
not interest themselves in an argument they must ignore, and
the supreme court justices may fail to give the written petition
for review the same attention they would be forced to give to a
matter argued orally before them. Under the present circum-
stances oral argument before the court of appeal on this kind
of issue is useless and it is not available before the supreme
court as a matter of right.
3. Barnett v. Barnett, 339 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 341
So. 2d 1127 (La. 1977). For reasons given in discussing Corpus Christi Parish Credit
Union v. Martin, 358 So. 2d 295 (La. 1978), infra at -, the writer would not consider
the "double declaration" unconstitutional if it were a rule of law; but this point is of
no relevance to the present discussion.
4. 357 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), citing Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co., 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970) and Pringle Associated Mort. Corp. v.
Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So. 2d 502 (1969).
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